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a b s t r a c t
The concept of property is integral to personal and societal development, yet understand-
ing of the cognitive basis of ownership is limited. Objects are the most basic form of prop-
erty, so our physical interactions with owned objects may elucidate nuanced aspects of
ownership. We gave participants a coffee mug to decorate, use and keep. The experimenter
also designed a mug of her own. In Experiment 1, participants performed natural lifting
actions with each mug. Participants lifted the Experimenter’s mug with greater care, and
moved it slightly more towards the Experimenter, while they lifted their own mug more
forcefully and drew it closer to their own body. In Experiment 2, participants responded
to stimuli presented on the mug handles in a computer-based stimulus–response compat-
ibility task. Overall, participants were faster to respond in trials in which the handles were
facing in the same direction as the response location compared to when the handles were
facing away. The compatibility effect was abolished, however, for the Experimenter’s
mug – as if the action system is blind to the potential for action towards another person’s
property. These ﬁndings demonstrate that knowledge of the ownership status of objects
inﬂuences visuomotor processing in subtle and revealing ways.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
‘‘Men would live exceedingly quiet if these two words,
mine and thine were taken away.’’ Anaxagoras (500
BC–428 BC)
The concept of ownership has been incredibly impor-
tant to humans for thousands of years. Possessions are an
integral part of self identity (Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992);
we spend much of our time and resources acquiring and
avoiding the loss of our things. Moreover, at a societal le-
vel, the management of property is an organising principle
of government and law enforcement. The concept of own-
ership and private property can be highly variable at a soci-
etal level; what one society recognises as being important
property might not be recognised in another (Etzioni,
1991). Hence, the development of culture is linked intrin-
sically to how property is managed (e.g. Maddux et al.,
2010; Mehta & Belk, 1991). Given the importance western
society places on private property, possessions, and owner-
ship, it is no surprise that ownership has been studied in a
range of disciplines. To date investigations into ownership
in the cognitive sciences have focused on select phenom-
ena associated with modelling economic markets and val-
uation judgements (Beggan, 1992; Kahneman, Knetsch, &
Thaler, 1990; Thaler, 1980). Here, we draw on the idea that
higher-level processes and cognitive abstractions may be
linked to perception and action, and propose that the visu-
omotor system responds differently to our own property
compared with objects owned by other individuals.
1.1. Self-owned property
Research has focused primarily on property in the ﬁrst
person – how does one represent one’s own property?
For example, work in behavioural economics reveals that
we place greater value on objects once we are given
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ownership rights to them (the ‘endowment effect’; Thaler,
1980). This greatly inﬂuential ﬁnding has also been dem-
onstrated with a number of different items, including the
type of stimuli used in the present study: coffee mugs.
When given a coffee mug, participants demand a higher
selling price for their mug than what they would be willing
to pay for an identical item when seeking to purchase. This
is a classic effect demonstrating irrationality in markets
(Kahneman et al., 1990; Maddux et al., 2010). Further,
the ‘mere ownership’ effect demonstrates an affective
inﬂuence of ownership: people prefer and give signiﬁ-
cantly more positive evaluations to items they own com-
pared to those they do not (Beggan, 1992).
The link between possessions and the self may help to
explain why we provide higher valuations (the endow-
ment effect) and positive attributes (mere-ownership ef-
fect) to owned items. That is, our tendency to have a
positive bias towards ourselves (e.g. Koole, Dijksterhuis,
& van Knippenberg, 2001) also extends to our property
(Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007). Further, the
self-relevance of our property may give rise to stronger
memory representations of our possessions relative to un-
owned objects (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae,
2008; van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010).
1.2. Property owned by others
Inappropriate interaction with objects that one does not
own can have negative consequences. Picking up some-
one’s drink in a bar might lead to a costly violent alterca-
tion. Relieving someone of their widescreen television
might attract unwanted attention from law enforcement
agents. As well as protecting one’s own possessions from
others, it is equally critical that one keeps track of who
owns everything else in the environment to avoid costly
transgressions. To function in society, one must rapidly
learn to detect the cues of ownership and conform to the
given societal norm of one’s culture. This is demonstrated
by the ﬁnding that children learn possessive pronouns by
the age of 16 months (Fenson et al., 1994). By the age of
two years, they understand when someone owns an object
even though a third person may be in possession of it (Fas-
ig, 2000). By age four, children infer an object’s owner as
the individual who controls permission of use (Neary,
Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). This is an important rule
one must learn – you can use your own object as you wish,
but can only touch others’ objects under special
circumstances.
Another cue to third-party ownership is knowing who
spent resources on the object. For example, the role of ef-
fort investment as a cue to ownership has a long theoreti-
cal history. From Locke’s ‘Labour Theory of Property’
(1690/1947), one may posit that creative labour in the pro-
duction of an object is a strong route to acquiring a sense of
ownership (see also Sartre, 1943/1989). Four-year olds are
able to generalise Locke’s theory beyond their own posses-
sions to other people’s property: they take into account the
creative labour invested in an object when deciding which
third party owns it (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010).
These developmental studies are clear examples that
show tracking the ownership status of, and regulating
our behavioural interactions with objects that are owned
by other individuals is critical to social cognition. Due to
the critical nature of physical interaction with property
at the basic level of owning artefacts, we hypothesise that
objects owned by other individuals will be treated very dif-
ferently by the visuomotor system compared with how it
treats our own property.
1.3. Property and the visuomotor system
As illustrated above, the possession of physical objects
is a fundamental type of property ownership. To make
and use property, one must physically interact with it.
Moreover, as noted above, we use cues from others’ phys-
ical interactions with objects to determine ownership sta-
tus (Kanngeisser et al., 2010). It may be that the converse is
also true: ownership status may affect ones physical inter-
actions with objects. An increasingly important theoretical
notion in cognitive science is the idea that high-level cog-
nitions can be reﬂected in, and inﬂuenced by, bodily states
(e.g. Niedenthal, 2007). Evidence for the ‘embodiment’ of
abstract concepts has been found for preferences (Beilock
& Holt, 2007; van den Bergh, Vrana, & Eelen, 1990), social
perception (Tipper & Bach, 2008), political afﬁliation
(Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010) and stereotypes (Mussweiler,
2006). For example, it has been demonstrated experimen-
tally that when one considers the future, one leans forward
slightly, but leans back if pondering the past (Miles, Nind,
& Macrae, 2010). The concept of ownership could also bias
the action system in related ways, especially given the of-
ten ‘concrete’ nature of physical property – much of our
interaction with property is active. Hence, we conducted
two experiments to determine if the concept of property
is indeed represented in the visuomotor system and can
thereby inﬂuence our interactions with objects that we
own, and objects that another individual is known to own.
1.4. The present study
Overall, we hypothesise that participants will exhibit
facilitated interactions with their own property and a ret-
icence to interact with other people’s property. This should
be revealed in task performance when objects vary as a
product of owner. In Experiment 1, participants performed
natural actions with mugs that differed in terms of owner-
ship. We analysed the trajectory and acceleration as the
mugs moved through space. Acceleration of the hand has
been linked previously to the perceived fragility of an ob-
ject; we are less forceful when approaching fragile objects
(Savelsbergh, Steenbergen, & van der Kamp, 1996). As
already noted, developmental research shows that the
ability to determine ownership status is a valuable skill
that children quickly acquire. This may be because violat-
ing the social norms associated with property could have
negative consequences. Breaking one’s own object is a
waste of resources, but inappropriate treatment of others’
property might land you in jail or with a bloody nose. A
less drastic consequence of careless use of another’s
property is embarrassment or social exclusion. For these
reasons, we predict that the motor system will
spontaneously take more care, as evidenced by less force,
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with other-owned items as compared with those that are
self-owned.
We also anticipate that ownership status will inﬂuence
the spatial aspects (i.e. trajectory) of the mug lifting action.
If rich representations associated with the ownership sta-
tus of mugs leak into the action system, then we expect
that participants will draw their own mug slightly closer
towards themselves spontaneously during the lifting phase
and will push the other-owned mug slightly away. This
will reﬂect facilitation for interacting with one’s own prop-
erty and a reluctance to interact with objects owned by
other people. In sum, the action systemwill reveal the acti-
vation of high-level concepts relating to the social norms of
interacting with property.
In Experiment 2, we looked at automatically evoked ac-
tion in relation to ownership status With a computer-
based stimulus–response compatibility (S-RC) task (see
Hommel, 2000; Proctor, in press, for reviews) to investi-
gate automatically evoked action towards mugs with dif-
ferent owners. In this paradigm, responses are facilitated
when they are lateralised to the same side of space as
the imperative stimulus (Simon, 1969). Extending this gen-
eral ﬁnding to graspable objects, Tucker and Ellis (1998)
showed that objects automatically potentiate components
of the actions they afford. That is, a mug with a handle on
the right will facilitate right-handed responses. In terms of
the present study, we predict that the motor codes associ-
ated with one’s own objects will be stronger than those
associated with other mugs. Furthermore, we also predict
that the action system will suppress the potential for inter-
action with other people’s property. Hence, the overall
compatibility effect will be relatively strong for the
participant’s own mug, but rather weak for experimenter’s
mug.
Using these two different approaches we provide con-
verging evidence suggesting that differentiating between
self- and other owned objects inﬂuences the action system.
As such, this is the ﬁrst evidence that ownership inﬂuences
visuomotor processing and performance.
2. Experiment 1
We gave participants white ceramic coffee mugs to dec-
orate and own. The mugs were theirs to keep even after the
experiment concluded. With motion capture cameras, we
recorded natural lifting and replacing actions with their
own mug, one introduced as being owned by the Experi-
menter and one without an explicitly-deﬁned owner. To
assess the impact of ownership status on object-oriented
action, we measured acceleration and spatial displacement
of the mugs while they were lifted off the table surface.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Nineteen right-handed individuals volunteered to take
part in both experiments (mean age = 20.11 years,
SD = 4.61 years; three were male). Participants were una-
ware of the purpose of the experiment, gave informed con-
sent, and received course credit in return for participation.
2.1.2. Materials and apparatus
Twenty-one physically identical white ceramic mugs
served as stimuli (height 10 cm, diameter of base 6 cm,
weight 0.33 kg). Participants were invited to decorate one
mug using an assortment of eighteen colours of enamel
paint, then take it home to use daily. Participants returned
to the laboratory between 12 and 16 days later (M = 14.3 d,
SD = 1.2 d), and completed both Experiments 1 and 2. Self-
reported usage rates ranged from 0.40 to 4.20 times per
day (M = 1.31, SD = 0.86). For each participant, their own
decorated mug, a decorated mug introduced as the exper-
imenters, and an undecorated mug (‘Unowned’) served as
reach targets. Movement in Cartesian coordinate space
(x = left–right; y = forward-back; z = up–down) was cap-
tured at 100 Hz using a Qualisys ProReﬂex motion tracking
system and a reﬂective marker placed on each mug, two
centimetres below the rim. The kinematics of the hand
were also measured, but we focus solely on how partici-
pants moved the mug itself.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
We used a single factor within-subjects design. ‘Mug
Ownership’ had 3 levels: Participant, Unowned, and Exper-
imenter. Although we explicitly informed participants that
the Experimenter’s mug was owned by the Experimenter,
we did not mention the ownership status of the ‘Unowned’
mug. Each trial began with the participant’s eyes closed
and their right hand resting at the edge of the table with
their index ﬁnger and thumb resting together at a marked
point. The experimenter then placed one of the three mugs
on the table at one of three pre-marked locations 30 cm
from the starting position (directly in front of the partici-
pant or 40 to the left and right; see Fig. 1). We instructed
participants to open their eyes after a tone sounded, and
reach, grasp the handle, lift, and then replace the mug in
a natural, ﬂuent action. They then returned their hand to
the starting position. A total of 108 actions were per-
formed, 36 for each mug split evenly across the three loca-
tions. Mug type and location were selected randomly on
each trial.
2.1.4. Data analysis
After removing trials with recording errors (0.01%), we
calculated three measures to analyse the spatial trajectory
of the mug during the lift and replace phase of the actions.
‘Lift Height’ was the maximum height reached by the mug
while being lifted by the participant (i.e. ‘z-max’). Displace-
ment of the mug marker at this ‘z-max’ point along the x-
and y-axes were calculated as measures of spatial displace-
ment relative to the original location of the mug (produc-
ing the measures ‘x at z-max’ and ‘y at z-max). To analyse
the in-ﬂight force (acceleration and deceleration) applied
to the mug during transport, we calculated two measures.
‘Peak acceleration during lift’ was calculated as the maxi-
mum acceleration (in metres per second squared) that oc-
curred between the beginning of the lift and maximum
height. ‘Peak deceleration during replacement’ was calcu-
lated as the maximal deceleration of the mug between
‘z-max’ and when the mug had come to rest back on the
table.
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2.2. Results & discussion
Before focusing on the parameters of primary interest,
we present some general features of the actions. The par-
ticipants were making natural and ﬂuid actions; average
movement initiation time was 846 ms (SD = 237 ms). The
entire action took 1970 ms (SD = 514 ms), with the mug
being off the surface of the table for an average of
1001 ms (SD = 369 ms).
2.3.1. Spatial manipulation of property
The spatial measures are taken at the time the mug
reaches a maximum height; we therefore entered ‘z-max’
as a covariate in the analysis of x and y position of the
mug. Firstly, the mugs deviated to the right while being
lifted. Mixed model analysis of this deviation along the x-
axis showed this effect varied as a function of ownership,
F(2,18.0) = 9.52, p = .002. The Experimenter’s mug was dis-
placed further along this axis (13.7 mm) relative to the Par-
ticipant’s mug (11.5 mm, t(18.2) = 4.31, p < .001) and the
Unowned mug (11.7 mm, t(18.2) = 3.34, p = .004). Partici-
pants drew each of the mugs towards their body (i.e. along
the y-axis). The effect of ownership on ‘y position at z-max’
did not reach signiﬁcance, F(2,17.9) = 2.63, p = .100. Never-
theless, contrasts revealed that participants brought their
own mug closer towards themselves (19.5 mm along the
y-axis) than the Experimenter’s mug (17.3 mm,
t(16.9) = 2.27, p = .037, see Fig. 2a), while the contrast be-
tween Participant’s mug and Unowned mug (16.9 mm)
was non-signiﬁcant, t(18.3) = 1.48, p = .16. This is an
intriguing pattern of data that shows the mug’s lift trajec-
tory depends upon who owns it. Note that the experi-
menter was seated to the participant’s right during the
experiment, which means that when considering the x
and y deviation together, these mugs drifted slightly to-
wards their owner.
The drift of their own mug closer towards themselves
may reﬂect the over-learned motor experience of bringing
that particular mug to their mouths to drink from it. In
considering the deviation along the x axis, it is a beguiling
conclusion to draw that the Experimenter’s mug drifts to-
wards its owner. Because the Experimenter was only ever
to the right of the Participant, however, for now we inter-
pret this hypermetric movement to the right as an indica-
tion of a tendency to avoid bringing an other-owned mug
towards oneself. These displacement measures, in particu-
lar ‘x position at z-max,’ are very strong indicative evidence
of a degree of inﬂuence of ownership in the control of sim-
ple hand-object interactions. Overall, we bring our own ob-
jects towards us, and move objects that are owned by
someone else away from our body.
2.3.2. Dynamic manipulation of property
We were also interested in the forces that the partici-
pants spontaneously applied to the mugs. We measured
this by calculating the maximum acceleration of the mug
during lift, and maximum deceleration during descent to-
wards the surface of the table (see Fig. 2b). There was an
effect of ownership on maximum acceleration, F(2,36) =
9.44, MSe = 0.241, p < .001, g2p ¼ :34, due to a greater
A
Y
X
Z B
Fig. 1. Panel A: Illustration of the experimental set-up (not to scale) for Experiment 1. The mug is positioned at one of three marked locations in front of the
Participant, with the Experimenter positioned to the right. The task was simply to reach for, pick up and replace the mug. Panel B: Examples of mugs used.
From top, Experimenter’s mug, Unowned mug, three Participants’ mugs.
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average maximum acceleration while lifting one’s own
mug (5.77 ms2) than the Unowned mug (5.36 ms2,
t(18) = 2.67, p = .016, d = 0.61) and the Experimenter’s
mug (5.09 ms2, t(18) = 3.76, p = .001, d = 0.86). Similarly,
the deceleration during replacement ANOVA was signiﬁ-
cant, F(2,36) = 11.1, MSe = 0.306, p < .001, g2p ¼ :38. This
was due to lower maximal deceleration of the Experi-
menter’s mug (3.89 ms2) compared with the Unowned
mug (4.53 ms2, t(18) = 2.99, p = .008, d = 0.69) and the
Participant’s mug (4.69 ms2, t(18) = 4.82, p < .001,
d = 1.11). Therefore, when lifting and replacing a mug, par-
ticipants spontaneously subjected their own property to
greater force than when interacting with the Experi-
menter’s property. This pattern of data is best explained
by the notion that the motor system exerts more care
when interacting with others’ property than with one’s
own, despite the fact that the action-relevant physical
properties (i.e. mass, shape and volume) of each object
are identical.
3. Experiment 2
The ﬁrst experiment provided initial evidence that our
physical interactions with objects can be affected by the
knowledge that the object has an owner. With the same
participants, we investigated the automatic evocation of
action towards self-owned vs. other-owned mugs using a
compatibility task. Even this highly automatic effect might
be modulated by a socio-emotional variable such as
ownership. We therefore hypothesise that in Experiment
2 these motor-priming effects may be boosted for one’s
own mug but suppressed for objects owned by another.
That is, the compatibility effect would be larger for the par-
ticipant’s own mug and smaller for the Experimenter’s
mug. This would provide converging evidence, from a dif-
ferent paradigm, for our general thesis that the visuomotor
system represents knowledge of property.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Stimuli
Photographs of each mug with their handles pointing
left and right (90) were edited to make two versions of
each picture with a semi-transparent green or red patch
placed over the mug handle. Each stimulus was presented
life-size, with a black background, on a monitor placed
30 cm away. For a given participant, their stimuli would
comprise the Participant’s mug, the Experimenter’s mug,
an Unowned mug and two randomly-selected mugs that
had been decorated by other participants (i.e. ‘Other-
owned’ mugs). These mugs introduced variety into the
task, to take focus away from the mugs that the partici-
pants had been using in Experiment 1. It is critical to note
that we never made it explicit that these ‘Other-owned’
mugs were the property of other people. The experimenter
simply stated that ‘they would see some decorated mugs
that they had not seen before’. That is, we only made own-
ership explicit with regard to the Experimenter’s mug.
A B
Fig. 2. Panel A: Graph illustrating the x (left–right) and y (toward-away) positions of the mug at the maximum mug height (z = 184 mm,190 mm, 195 mm
for Unowned, Experimenters and Participants respectively) attained during lift phase of the action, for each mug type relative to the starting position on the
table (i.e. x = 0, y = 0, z = 0). Panel B: Maximal acceleration of the mug during the lift phase, andmaximal deceleration during the replace phase for each mug.
Error bars in both panels denote standard error of the mean for within-subjects effects (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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Hence, for each participant, there were ﬁve mugs, each
presented in two orientations and each with two coloured
handles (twenty stimuli). Responses were made with the
‘z’ (left) and ‘m’ (right) keys of a standard keyboard.
3.2.1. Procedure
On each trial, a white central ﬁxation cross appeared
(1.5 x 1.5 cm) for 1000 ms before the mug. The mug re-
mained onscreen until the participant made a response.
This was followed by a 250 ms inter-trial interval. We in-
structed participants to maintain ﬁxation and to respond
to the colour of the mug handle as quickly and accurately
as possible. The mug would have the handle pointing to
the left or right, but we impressed upon the participants
to ignore stimulus orientation and respond only to the col-
our. Half the participants responded to red handles with
the left key and green handles with the right key. We gave
the remaining participants the reverse response assign-
ments. A tone sounded in the event of an incorrect re-
sponse. Participants completed 400 trials over four
blocks. We presented each stimulus equally often and it
was selected randomly on each trial. Hence, for each
mug, there were forty compatible and forty incompatible
trials. Trials from the two ‘Other-owned’ mugs were col-
lapsed into one level. The experiment took 15 min and
was completed immediately after Experiment 1.
3.2.2. Design
There were two within-subjects factors. ‘Compatibility’
described whether the side of the handle of the mug was
the same as the correct response side (Compatible) or the
opposite side (Incompatible). The factor ‘Mug’ had four lev-
els determined by the owner of each stimulus, ‘Participant’,
‘Experimenter’, ‘Other’ and ‘Unowned’. Mean correct
reaction time for each cell, along with percent error rates
were analysed.
3.3. Results and Discussion
Technical failure led to the loss of one participant’s
data; henceforth, n = 18. Errors were infrequent (3.1% of
trials) and a Mug Type (4) x Compatibility (2) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant effects. Reaction
time outliers were removed (3SD above or below the par-
ticipant’s mean RT; 1.8% of trials) prior to calculation of
mean RT for correct trials in each condition for each partic-
ipant. The main effect of ‘Mug’ was signiﬁcant,
F(3,51) = 2.84, MSe = 931, p = .047, g2p ¼ :14, with overall
colour decision responses being quickest for Unowned
mug (556 ms) and slowest for the Participant’s mug
(577 ms). The main effect of ‘Compatibility’ was also signif-
icant, F(1,17) = 11.2, MSe = 1694, p = .004, g2p ¼ :40, due to
faster RTs on Compatible compared with Incompatible tri-
als (555 ms vs. 578 ms), replicating the classic S-RC effect.
Critically, the ‘Mug Type’ x ‘Compatibility’ interaction
was also signiﬁcant, F(3,51) = 4.26, MSe = 507, p = .009,
g2p ¼ :20. The source of this interaction was established
with paired-samples t-tests, comparing RTs in Compatible
trials with RTs in Incompatible trials for each Mug Type.
Although the Participant’s Mug (35 ms, t(17) = 4.42,
p < .001, d = 1.04), the Unowned Mug, (33 ms, t(17) =
2.92, p = .009, d = 0.69), and the Other-Owned Mugs
(23 ms, t(17) = 2.56, p = .020, d = 0.60) elicited signiﬁcant
S-RC effects, the Experimenter’s Mug did not, (1 ms,
t(17) = .13, p = .90, d = 0.03). This S-RC effect was signiﬁ-
cantly weaker than the effects elicited by each of the other
mug types (Participant’s, Other and Unowned, t’s > 2.4,
p’s < .026) (see Fig. 3b). In effect, the visuomotor system
is blind to the affordances of other people’s objects.
Fig. 3. Graph illustrating mean reaction times for each mug type and compatibility condition. Error bars denote standard error of the mean for within-
subjects effects (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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It is conceivable, though unlikely, that some visual as-
pect of the particular design of the Experimenter’s mug
abolished the S-RC effects. To take account of this potential
concern, ten new participants were recruited and com-
pleted the same task. Importantly, they neither owned,
nor were aware of the ownership status of any mug. The
only signiﬁcant effect was ‘Compatibility’, F(1,9) = 16.8,
MSe = 998, p = .003, g2p ¼ :65, due to a 29 ms S-RC effect.
Critically, the Experimenter’s mug elicited a highly signiﬁ-
cant effect (37 ms, t(9) = 4.20, p = .002, d = 1.33), which
was signiﬁcantly larger than that elicited in the main
experimental sample who saw the identical visual stimu-
lus, but knew the mug to be owned by the Experimenter
(1 ms vs. 37 ms, t(26) = 2.50, p = .019, d = 1.04). It is there-
fore unlikely that a visual feature of the stimuli was
responsible for the pattern of results in Experiment 2.
4. General discussion
Taken together, these ﬁndings are consistent with the
idea that ownership is taken into account by the visuomo-
tor system during object-oriented action. In Experiment 1
we showed that participants had a tendency to move the
Experimenter’s mug further to the right and with a lower
maximum in-ﬂight acceleration as compared to the other
mugs. This pattern of results may reﬂect a reluctance to
interact with, and an extra degree of care when manipulat-
ing, other peoples’ possessions. In Experiment 2, we dem-
onstrated that the compatibility effect evoked for
lateralised stimuli is abolished for the Experimenter-
owned mug. This striking result suggests that even at the
initial stages of action representations – without overt ac-
tion towards a physical object – the visuomotor system is
sensitive to information about the ownership status of
the object.
It is clear that the concept of ownership is a complex
convergence of multiple interacting facets, such as mem-
ory (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2008), preference (Huang,
Wang, & Shi, 2009), and visuomotor experience. A possible
alternative explanation of some of our data may be that
practice or familiarity accounts for stronger force applied
to one’s ownmug, and for why one might draw it closer to-
wards the body. This cannot explain, however, why the
Experimenter’s mug was drawn signiﬁcantly further to
the right during lifting. Nor can this account explain why
S-RC effects were absent only for the Experimenter’s
mug. Increased valuation of one’s own mug also cannot
adequately account for any of the effects that relate to
the objects owned by the experimenter; ‘mere ownership’
and ‘endowment’ effects focus on how we value self-
owned objects alone. Indeed, the overall pattern of our
data suggests that the motor system is highly tuned to
detecting and avoiding interaction with objects owned by
a known other, perhaps more than potentiating action to-
wards objects that are self-owned. Therefore, the most par-
simonious overall explanation of our data is that the
concept of ownership is to some extent represented in
the action system, and can inﬂuence our naturalistic
(Experiment 1) and indirect (Experiment 2) interactions
with property. This is consistent with growing assertions
in the ﬁeld that action and social context are entwined
(Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Georgiou, Becchio, Glover &
Castiello, 2007; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). As
such, it is reasonable to suggest that ownership, as a social
construct, may be to some extent embodied in the visuo-
motor system. One could even be tempted to speculate
that owning an object might eventually prove to be some-
what similar to body-ownership (e.g. Blakemore & Frith,
2003; Gallagher, 2000), given the inextricable link between
the self and property (James, 1890).
Still, we are mindful that our data speaks more strongly
towards an inhibition of action involving others’ posses-
sions rather than a facilitation of action towards self-
owned items. This may reﬂect the role of social norms
associated with avoiding other people’s property to pre-
vent conﬂicts within relationships, but also of avoiding
exposure to contaminants in vessels that have been drunk
from by others. Further, presence of the owner, and
whether explicit knowledge of ownership status is neces-
sary to elicit these effects are important research ques-
tions. Future work will doubtlessly further elucidate the
cognitive basis of how our behaviour is guided through a
world in which almost all artefacts are owned by individu-
als or organisations. Perhaps then, the ‘disquiet’ to which
Anaxagoras hinted might be at least better understood, if
not tempered.
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